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Bilal Ağa: Uh-huh. We're gone, we've perished. They're successful 
including women in their brigades.
Ahmet Ağa: It doesn't matter that the women are working, it's that 
they have lost their honour.
Mula Ağa (lying in the foreground): Their cooperatives will collapse. 
Shall we see at some point what will happen? Just in case. 
Musli Ağa: There is no question of 'Just in case' here. We have lost 
the war. May God bring something from either the east or west.
The Empire's Forgotten Children: 
Understanding the Path from Ottomanism to 
Titoism in Muslim Macedonia, 1912-1953
Ryan Gingeras 
Readers of the weekly newspaper Birlik (Unity) would have come across this 
cartoon on the week of 10 November 1949. As the sole Turkish-language newspaper 
servicing the newly created Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Birlik fielded 
similar commentaries and predications week after week since its establishment in 
1947. Cartoons and articles like this one attested to the fact that life and politics had 
indeed rapidly changed since Tito's ascendancy over a reconstituted Yugoslavia. 
Literacy programs, collectivization, popular elections, school openings, show 
trials and urban reconstruction were among the many life-altering happenings 
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shaping Macedonia's first steps down the road towards socialism. Birlik's mandate 
and purpose during this time was clear and concise: to inform, to convince and 
to celebrate Macedonia's Muslim population and to incorporate them into the 
workings of the new state that was emerging around them.
Birlik's readers could have understood or interpreted Musli Ağa's lament in a 
couple of ways. From their porch overlooking the field below, the four ağas (lords 
or landowners) fit the model of the owners and exploiters of the ancien regime. 
Communism's rise over the new Yugoslavia promised to reconfigure or destroy 
all political, economic and social institutions associated with the exploitation, 
oppression and backwardness of the past. Yet, in the case of Macedonia's 
Muslims, this did not simply mean the erasure of twenty-three years of rule under 
the Yugoslav monarchy. The ağas, with their fezzes, baggy trousers, turbans, 
beards and prayer beads, symbolized the living relics of the Ottoman Empire. 
God, despite Musli's invocation, would assuredly not save these old mummies 
from the establishment of a new, revolutionary Yugoslavia.
 Birlik's significance, as both an institution and a body of commentary, should 
not be seen strictly in terms of its overall effect on the construction of socialism in 
Yugoslavia. If we approach this paper with a longer lens, Birlik instead provides 
us with a unique look at the challenges and the meaning of being Muslim in this 
central portion of South-Eastern Europe at the mid-twentieth century.
This paper provides an extended historiographical genealogy of the people 
who found their way into the pages of Birlik and attempts to explain the continuities 
and points of departure that marked the evolution of Muslim Macedonia between 
1908 and 1953. Broadly speaking, it presents an effort to understand the evolution 
of identity and political participation among an ever shrinking and evolving set of 
Muslim leaders found in what once was, arguably, the heart of the Ottoman Empire.
Muslims and Ottoman Macedonia, 1908-1912
As one peruses the master narratives set out by Leften Stavrianos or Peter Sugar, 
one gets the sense that the turn of the twentieth century was a time of rising 
expectations and national restoration for each of Macedonia's competing Orthodox 
Christian movements (be it Bulgarian, Serb, Greek or Macedonian). As one looks 
a bit closer at the 'national' histories of Andrew Rossos, Richard Crampton or 
Robert Clogg, revolution and nationalist revival assuredly did produce winners 
and losers among the region's Christians. The violent struggle for 'national 
liberation', which was topped off by the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, did produce 
great gains on the part of Greece and Serbia, mixed returns for Bulgaria and an 
almost total disaster from the perspective of Macedonian nationalists.1
1 Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); R. J. 
Crampton, A Short History of Modern Bulgaria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); 
Andrew Rossos, Macedonia and the Macedonians: A History (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 2008); 
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Macedonia's Muslim population is rarely included within the commonly 
accepted narrative of the region's history. This omission appears all the more 
glaring when one considers the demographic realities of the turn of the twentieth 
century. Although census taking in Ottoman Macedonia should be understood as 
an often deeply politicized act of statist intervention (which tended to cross the 
border into propaganda),2 various sources demonstrate that Muslims constituted 
sizable portions of Ottoman Macedonia's urban and rural landscape. Natural 
population growth and repeated waves of migration (largely as a result of war) 
amplified the Muslim presence in Macedonia between 1878 and 1912. Justin 
McCarthy points out, for example, that the Muslim population of the central 
province of Manastır [Bitola] tripled in size between 1876 and 1911.3 If we 
look still closer at specific counties and districts embedded within the remaining 
provinces of Macedonia, the profundity of the Muslim presence in Macedonia 
appears even more conspicuous.4 
Including Muslims in a revised history of Ottoman Macedonia does not 
begin and end with statistics. Naturally no 'Muslim state' emerges out the ashes of 
Ottoman Macedonia in the wake of the Balkan Wars. Instead, scholars have tended 
to emphasize that Muslims in the region did have nation-states to turn to following 
the collapse of imperial rule in old Rumeli: the Republic of Albania (established 
in 1912) and Anatolia (soon to be reconstituted as the Republic of Turkey in 
1923). This understanding of the post-Balkan Wars settlement is implicitly based 
on the supposition that Macedonia's Muslim population could neatly be divided 
into two separate and clearly delineated ethnic groups: Albanians and Turks.5 If 
one accepts this presumption without any reservation, then the integrity of the old 
narrative remains intact. Despite the bloodshed and carnage of the Balkan Wars, 
virtually everyone gets what they ultimately wanted; each 'nation' receives, in due 
course, a state.
Yet, if one looks closely at several developing trends within Ottoman 
historiography, such a conclusion is undermined by two fundamental 
misconceptions. The first concerns the correlation between language and ethnic 
identity. Ottoman Macedonia was among the most linguistically diverse portions 
of the empire. By 1900, the provinces of Macedonia contained several prosperous 
cities and towns located within a short distance from the imperial capital of 
Leften Stavrianos, The Balkans from 1453 (New York: New York University Press, 2000); Peter Sugar 
and Ivo Lederer, eds., Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994).
2 İpek Yosmaoğlu, 'Counting Bodies, Shaping Souls: The 1903 Census and National Identity in Ottoman 
Macedonia', International Journal of Middle East Studies 38 (2006): 55-77.
3 Justin McCarthy, 'Muslims in Ottoman Europe: Population from 1800 to 1912', Nationalities Papers, 28, 
1 (2000): 36.
4 See Vasil Kunchev, Makedoniya: Etnografiya i Statistika [Macedonia: Ethnography and Statics] (Sofia: 
Durzhaven Pechatnica, 1900), 140-142, 153, 249.
5 See for example Kazim Nami Duru, Arnavutluk ve Makedonya Hatıralarım [My Memories: Albania and 
Macedonia] (Istanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1959).
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Istanbul, including Salonika, Üsküp, Manastır, Prizren, Drama, Siroz (Seres) 
and Ohri (Ohrid).6 As the Ottoman state became increasingly centralized during 
the turn of the century, towns and cities such as these became the harbingers of 
Ottoman modernity. The Muslim elites of these towns were by and large educated 
in schools established by the state or by foreign agencies and adapted themselves 
to the tastes and manners of the capital. Although the political allegiance of 
these Muslim urban-dwellers (şehirli) to the Ottoman state may have ultimately 
diverged, Burcu Akan Ellis asserts that Ottoman Turkish remained their lingua 
franca.7 In looking at the history of urban Muslim emigration from Macedonia 
in the twentieth century, she considers that şehirli identity was an amalgamation 
of these shared linguistic (Turkish) and socio-economic (elite, i.e. merchant, 
professional, administrator) traits. To be şehirli did not necessarily mean to be 
'Turkish' in an ethno-linguistic sense, despite the fact that non-Muslims and 
villagers often referred to them as 'Turks'.8 The flow of migrants into these 
Balkan cities during the nineteenth century created an urban population that 
was inherently multilingual. Nevertheless, according to Akan Ellis, the elite 
notion of being an urban-dweller sublimated the fact that one could also speak 
Albanian, Macedonian, Bulgarian or even Romani. In short, the allure of living 
in town required one to integrate and adopt Turkish as the language of day-to-day 
expression and assume the dress and demeanour of the imperial upwardly mobile.9
Life beyond the city limits of these urban Ottoman centres differed 
dramatically. If to live in a city carried with it the cachet of being educated and 
affluent, the characteristics of a villager (köylü) were ignorance, coarseness 
(bordering on inherent criminality) and provincialism. In this environment where 
state education and influence were less present, local languages, as opposed to the 
state language, Turkish, were more dominant. In the case of Kosova and to a large 
degree Macedonia, the dominant language among rural Muslim communities was 
Albanian.10 This did not mean, as in the case of urban Muslim society, that all 
Muslims living in the countryside were Albanians. Rather, in this multilingual 
environment, Albanian served as a lingua franca for Muslims who may have also 
spoken Turkish, Romani, Greek or a Slavic language. Dress, customs and other 
day-to-day social practices were also affected by the pervasiveness of Albanian-
6 Fikret Adanır, 'The Macedonians in the Ottoman Empire, 1878-1912', in The Formation of National 
Elites, vol. 4, ed. Andreas Kappeler (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 162-164. 
7 Burcu Akan Ellis, Shadow Genealogies: Memories and Identity among Urban Muslims in Macedonia 
(Boulder, CO.: Eastern European Monographs, 2003), 28. 
8 Eran Fraenkel, 'Urban Muslim Identity in Macedonia: The Interplay between Ottomanism and 
Multilingual Nationalism', in Eran Fraenkel and Christina Kramer, eds., Language Contact, Language 
Conflict, (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 32.
9 Akan Ellis, Shadow Genealogies, 30-32. 
10 One noted exception to this rule in Macedonia is the presence of large numbers of rural Turkish speakers 
in the south-eastern portions of Macedonia (such as around Strumica). This population has often been 
described as the collective descendants of Yörük or nomadic Turkic peoples.
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speakers.11 Yet it was possible that both urban and rural families may have even 
been divided as to what language or customs predominated within the household.12 
Situations such as these dilute the notion that there is a pure Albanian of 
native stock or an individual of pure Anatolian Turkish descent. A similar set of 
blurred lines that separated Ottoman 'Albanians' and 'Turks' cut across Orthodox 
Christian families and communities in Macedonia. Provincial Christians, who 
often spoke multiple languages themselves, bedevilled nationalist activists, 
guerrillas, Westerners and Ottoman administrators with their ability to bend to 
either the Serb, Bulgarian or Greek national persuasion. 
The second misconception involves the development of competing and 
irreconcilable brands of nationalism among Macedonian Muslims. In keeping 
with the sort of nationalist clashes documented among and between Bulgarians, 
Greeks, Serbs and Macedonians, scholars have tended to emphasize that a similar 
evolution defined and divided Albanians and Turks in Macedonia. Of the two, 
Albanians appeared to have grasped the power and potential of nationalism first. 
Albanian nationalist orthodoxy dictates that despite the influence held by many 
Albanians within Ottoman Empire, Albanian resistance to Ottoman rule had been 
the norm since the fifteenth century. Fear of the empire's collapse and the threat of 
partition by Serbia, Greece and the Great Powers of Europe gave greater urgency 
to this resistance and instilled the need for an independent Albanian state.13 A 
lockstep alliance of Albanian politicians and intellectuals inside and outside 
the empire advanced the cause of Albanian independence. Istanbul meanwhile 
responded to Albanian calls for independence with violence and oppression. A 
partial victory came only after a period of mass rebellion and war between 1910 
and 1912, a period that resulted in the establishment of the Republic of Albania 
and the Serb partition of Albanian-inhabited lands in Macedonia.14 
Turkish nationalism, as many would have it, arrived much later and set more 
shallow roots in Ottoman Macedonia. While the politics of Albanian identity grew 
more articulate, most Turks remained woefully attached to the doomed Ottoman 
state and failed to conjure an ethno-national vision of themselves until it was 
too late.15 That is not to say, however, that Macedonia and Macedonian politics 
11 Akan Ellis, Shadow Genealogies, 31.
12 Fraenkel, 'Urban Muslim Identity', 33.
13 Aleks Buda et al., Historia e Popullit Shqiptar: Vëllimi i Dytë, Rilindja Kombëtare [History of the 
Albanian Peoples, vol. 2, National Movement] (Tirana: Toena, 2000), 17-31; T. Zavallani, 'Albanian 
Nationalism', in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo Lederer, eds., Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1994), 62-76.
14 See Nuray Bozbora, Osmanlı Yönetiminde Arnavutluk ve Arnavut Ulusçuluğunun Gelişimi [Albania 
under Ottoman Administration and the development of the Albanian National Movement] (Istanbul: 
Boyut Kitapları, 1997); George Gawrych, The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam and the 
Albanians, 1871-1913 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006).
15 See Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000), 174.
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played no role in the development of Turkish nationalism. When the concept of 
Anatolian Turkishness did finally materialize, it would do so in the context of 
the Macedonian port city of Salonika. Successive generations of historians have 
noted with great irony that Salonika equally served as both the physical birthplace 
of Mustafa Kemal, founder of the Turkish Republic, and the intellectual cradle of 
Ziya Gökalp, the so-called father of Turkish nationalism.16
While one cannot dispute the emergence and eventual exclusivity of Albanian 
or Turkish nationalist tendencies, a new wave of scholarship complicates our 
understanding of the origins and points of departure of these two ideologies. 
Several recent studies of the late Ottoman state have tended to focus on the 
unifying efforts undertaken by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). 
Many of the core members of the CUP were born and raised in Macedonia. 
Many of these same individuals spoke both Turkish and Albanian and possessed 
close connections to Muslim urban and rural notables. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Erik Jan 
Zürcher and others have convincingly demonstrated that the CUP movement, 
from its local conception in 1906, mobilized support across a broad swath of 
Muslim interests in Macedonia.17 In order to save the Ottoman state from collapse 
and partition, Young Turk activists championed the construction of a 'modern', 
centralizing administration. The key to reform, in the minds of Young Turks, was 
incorporating all segments of the population (both Muslim and non-Muslim, as 
well as rural and urban citizens) into the workings of the state. Heavy emphasis was 
placed on expanding public education, a reformed judiciary, public disarmament 
and mass conscription as a means to both develop a more 'modern' society and 
promote a shared sense of Ottoman belonging. 'Fraternity' and 'Unity' were the 
watchwords of this era. 
The CUP's dedication to 'Brotherhood and Unity', however, came with one 
condition: the necessity of promoting Ottoman Turkish as the sole language of local 
administration. Rather than as an expression of a nascent Turkish nationalism, it 
is clear that this position was meant as a tool to regularize Ottoman governance 
and to tie the empire's incredibly diverse population more closely to Istanbul. 
Contrary to the more traditionalist interpretations of Ottoman history, more recent 
studies have shown that 'Turkist' sentiments found limited and often fair-weather 
appeal among CUP officials in the years leading up to the Balkan Wars.18
16 Ziya Gökalp, The Principles of Turkism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 8-9.
17 Şükru Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 221-242; Erik Jan Zürcher, 'Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: 
Identity Politics 1908-1938', in Kemal Karpat, ed., Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
2000), 150-179.
18 Howard Eissenstat, 'The Limits of Imagination: Debating the Nation and Constructing the State in 
Early Turkish Nationalism', (PhD diss., UCLA, 2007), 11-66; Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: 
Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918 (Berkeley: University of 
California, 1997), 113; Zürcher, 'Young Turks', 172-173.
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Despite the euphoria following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, tensions 
between supporters of the Young Turks and members of the provincial elite in 
Macedonia gradually intensified with the establishment of a CUP-led government. 
While few would question the unity and integrity of the empire, many dissidents 
questioned the extent to which CUP-inspired reforms intended to bring about 
a more consolidated state. In addition to issues surrounding disarmament and 
the Ottoman court system (which intruded on the long-held autonomy of rural 
communities), concerns were raised over the right for provincial administrators 
and educators to develop and use the Albanian language as the local lingua 
franca. Albanians, noted advocates argued, were a consolidated, integral 
population that deserved the right to determine what language (and in certain 
cases what laws) should be enforced at a local level. A similar 'decentralizing' 
tendency also manifested itself among Arab notables in Ottoman Syria, who also 
demanded the right to use Arabic, instead of Ottoman Turkish, as the main idiom 
of the administration.
The rebellions that did sweep through portions of Albanian-speaking regions 
of Macedonia (as well as Kosova and the Albanian highlands) between 1910 
and 1912 had little to do with these technical debates concerning identity and 
local sovereignty. Rather than as uprisings that manifested Albanian national 
discontent, rebellion among provincial Albanians during this period should be 
seen as stemming from both the hardships of conscription and mass disarmament 
and the fear of large landowners threatened with the loss of local autonomy.
In short, we should not think of the evolution of Muslim identity and politics in 
late Ottoman Macedonia as a bifurcating process that neatly divided communities 
along preset ethnic lines. Most Muslims in Macedonia lived in a world where 
the boundaries between 'being Albanian' and 'being Turkish' were traversable. 
Nationalism and ethnic self-discovery were instead issues that concerned small 
segments of the Ottoman elite. Even if one looks at the insistence with which 
certain Macedonian political leaders advocated the use of Albanian as the local 
idiom of governance as an expression of nationalism and self-determination, such 
steps were undertaken with the intent to renegotiate the contours of citizenship 
and belonging of a reformed Ottoman Empire. Save for the outbreak of rural 
rebellion and war with the neighbouring Balkan states, Albanian independence 
was not fated to happen.
Macedonian Muslims and royal Yugoslavia, 1912-1945
The year 1912 definitively marks the final fragmenting of Macedonian history. 
With the tripartite partition of the vilayets of Üsküp, Manastır and Selânik into 
the regions of Pirin (Bulgaria), Aegean (Greece) and Vardar (Serbia) Macedonia, 
an unprecedented era of nationalist hegemony was imposed on the land. Yet the 
Balkan Wars did not result in an equal sharing of Ottoman Rumeli or a mutual 
realization of each of the irredentist or nationalist designs of the pre-war political 
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factions. A second Balkan war waged solely against Bulgaria followed the first. 
For decades to come, self-styled Bulgarian and Macedonian militants would 
viciously contest the borders drawn by both conflicts. Other serious forms of 
resistance were displayed at local levels. The new administrators of occupied 
Macedonia confronted provincial populations that did not speak or refused to 
speak the 'national language'. A great many new citizens in Macedonia did not 
profess or practice the Orthodox rites endorsed by the state. Belgrade, Sofia and 
Athens responded to acts of local resistance with mass re-education and policing 
efforts tailored to forcibly teach these new citizens to be Serbs, Bulgarians 
or Greeks.19 
No centrally devised plan appeared to have guided Serb, Greek and Bulgarian 
violence towards Muslims during the First Balkan War. Combatants and non-
combatants were slaughtered with equal ferocity throughout the region. As tens 
of thousands of Muslim civilians fled for their lives, members of the provincial 
Ottoman administration followed in tow. According to statistics compiled after 
the war, over four hundred thousand Muslims abandoned their homes and took 
up residence in what remained of the Ottoman Empire. Most would never return.20
While the Ottoman administration may have finally been 'banished' from 
Europe in 1912, Muslim life in Macedonia did not completely come to an end. 
As brutal as the Balkan Wars would prove, conditions grew worse over the 
next decade. Serbia's defeat at the hands of the Austrians in 1915 transformed 
Macedonia into a battlefield yet again as British and French expeditionary troops 
came to the aid of the retreating Serbs. Apart from a few desperate efforts waged by 
the Ottoman clandestine service (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa or the Special Organization), 
Istanbul would abandon any hope of regaining the empire's severed territories. Of 
the three regions, Muslims in Bulgaria's portion of Macedonia would fare the best 
through the war and the immediately ensuing years. Since many of the region's 
Muslims were counted as Bulgarian-speakers (or Pomaks), most were spared 
deportation or threats of violence.21 Muslims in Greece and the newly constituted 
19 James Frusetta, 'Bulgaria's Macedonia: Nation-Building and State Building, Centralization and 
Autonomy in Pirin Macedonia, 1903-1952' (PhD diss., University of Maryland, 2006); Anastasia N. 
Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1997); Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History (New York: 
Modern Library, 2000), 117; Rossos, Macedonia, 131-153.
20 BCA 272.14.75.24.6.21, September 1920; 'Der Muhamedanische Exodus aus Makedonien [The 
Mohammedan Exodus from Macedonia]', Osmanischer Lloyd, 29 March 1914; 'Die Auswanderung 
aus Makedonien [The Outmigration from Macedonia]', Osmanischer Lloyd, 29 March 1914; The 
Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction 
and Reflections on the Present Conflict by George F. Kennan (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1993).
21 Frusetta, 'Bulgaria's Macedonia', 190. According to Bilal Şimşir, 43 percent of Nevrokop's population 
was Muslim in 1920. See Bilal Şimşir, 'The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria: History and Culture', in Kemal 
Karpat, ed., The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Culture and Political Fate of a Minority (Istanbul: Isis 
Press, 1990), 161.
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Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes did not manage as well.
Greece acquired hundreds of thousands of Albanian, Turkish, Slavic and 
Greek- speaking Muslims in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars. From virtually the 
outset of Athens's conquest of Macedonia, Greek and Ottoman representatives 
actively contemplated deportation as a means of resolving the region's demographic 
heterogeneity.22 Although the outbreak of world war negated attempts to negotiate 
an initial 'exchange of populations' between Greece and the Ottomans, CUP 
officials remained committed to the idea even after their defeat was assured in 
1918. Per the parameters of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, Orthodox Christians 
native to Anatolia were sent to Greece in exchange for 'Turks' living in Macedonia 
and the Epirus. Negotiators from Ankara explicitly requested and expected to 
receive Turkish-speaking Muslims in the agreement. To their disappointment, 
Greece also delivered thousands of Albanian-speaking Muslims (and perhaps 
Christians) in their stead. For all intensive purposes, though, the exchanges would 
extinguish Islam from the Aegean portion of Macedonia.23
A more complex array of challenges and complications confronted Muslims 
living in South Serbia (as Vardar Macedonia and Kosova became known during 
the interwar period). From its conception in 1918, the inherently 'multinational' 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was compelled to reckon with a 
Muslim population of several shades. Bosnia-Hercegovina's inclusion into royal 
Yugoslavia, with its large number of Slavic-speaking Muslims, had a particularly 
tempering effect on the way Belgrade would approach Islam and its adherents. In 
spite of successive waves of violence and forced migration, a shared fear of Serb 
aggrandizement in Bosnia allowed noted Bosnian Muslims to forge alliances with 
powerful Croat blocks at local and national levels. The common threat posed by 
an ascendant Serb voice in Yugoslav politics best served the Yugoslav Muslim 
Organization (Jugoslavenska Muslimanska Organizacija or JMO), the largest 
Bosnian Muslim party, which held a king-making position within the Yugoslav 
parliament for much of the 1920s.24 
The JMO's ability to reconcile the tenuous status occupied by Bosnian 
Muslims within the teetering realities of Yugoslav political life provided an 
initial standard for members of South Serbia's Muslim elite. In 1918 a consortium 
of larger landowners, urban notables and religious scholars formed the İslam 
Muhafaza-yı Hukuk Cemiyeti (the Committee of the Right of Islamic Defence 
or more commonly known as Cemiyet). The central principles of the party were 
22 Yannis G. Mourelos, 'The 1914 Persecutions and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between 
Greece and Turkey', Balkan Studies 26, 2 (1985): 389-413.
23 Dimitris Michalopoulos, 'The Moslems of the Chamuria and the Exchange of Populations between 
Greece and Turkey', Balkan Studies, 26, 2 (1985), 303; Rıza Nur, Hayat ve Hatıratım [My Recollections 
and Life], vol. 3 (Istanbul: Atındağ Yayınevi, 1968), 1097; PRO/FO 286/869, 31 December 1923.
24 Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1984), 368-377.
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limited but significant: preservation of Muslim autonomy in matters of worship, 
civil matters and religious endowments (vakıfs); the free use of 'respective mother 
tongues' in schools; and the conservation of landowning rights.25 Upon closer 
analysis, Cemiyet, as an elite party concerned largely with the preservation of 
local political and cultural autonomy, mirrored the decentralist organizations of 
the late Ottoman period. The willingness of Cemiyet's leadership to enter politics 
and collaborate with Belgrade was coupled with finite limits that, when pressed, 
could and did lead to outright opposition.
Many of the historical continuities and contradictions that defined Cemiyet's 
brief existence can be found in the life of its founder, Necip Draga. Necip Draga 
was among the founding members of the Committee of Union and Progress and 
served in the restored Ottoman parliament of 1908.26 His ability to straddle the 
urban-rural divide in large measure was at the heart of the political authority 
he garnered both locally and nationally. As the head of a family with extensive 
landholdings in northern Kosova, Necip possessed deep connections to the 
Albanian-speaking provincial establishment. Yet he was also a man in possession 
of a 'modern' education (he spoke French and German) who maintained a residence 
in the provincial capital of Skopje (or Üsküp in Turkish).27 
With the outbreak of strife in Kosova over conscription and disarmament, 
Necip and several other erstwhile supporters of the CUP turned their backs on 
Istanbul and supported the rebels. His support for the rural, primarily Albanian-
speaking rebels violently intersected with the outbreak of the Balkans Wars, the 
end of Ottoman rule in Macedonia and the declaration of Albanian independence. 
Unlike many administrators and Muslim men of means, Necip did not flee to 
Ottoman Anatolia and was arrested by advancing Serb forces.28 In his brother's 
absence, Ferhat Draga refocused the energies of rebels in Kosova and northern 
Macedonia towards Serb troops (going as far as raising men in support of the 
Austro-Hungarian offensive during the First World War).29 When a restored peace 
affirmed South Serbia's place in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the 
elder Draga and his brother resorted to party politics in order to maintain an active 
voice in local affairs.
 On 25 February 1919, almost three months after the establishment of the 
kingdom, the Yugoslav government formally abolished the Ottoman system of 
landholding.30 As an act that allowed local administrators the right to break up 
25 Ibid., 377; Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 270; 
'Ifade-i Meram', Hak, 23 Feburary 1920; Aleksandar Apostolov, Kolonizatzija na Makedonija vo Stara 
Jugoslavija [Colonization of Macedonia in Old Yugoslavia] (Skopje: Misla, 1980), 174-180.
26 Hanioğlu, Preparation, 230.
27 Gawrych, The Crescent, 162.
28 Ibid., 199.
29 Malcolm, Kosovo, 260. 
30 Ramiz Abdyli, 'The Expropriation of the Albanian Population and Attempts for Colonisation of Albanian 
Territories (1918-1941)', The Kosova Issue: A Historical and Current Problem (Tirana: Institute of 
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large estates throughout South Serbia (most of which were owned by Muslims), 
most land would be distributed to Orthodox (largely Serb) families and 
settlers.31 The prospect of 'land reform', which naturally stood to deeply injure 
wealthy Muslims in both Macedonia and Kosova, in turn served as Cemiyet 
first major rallying issue. Cemiyet's efforts to stymie or reverse the break-up of 
estates ironically found a willing ally in the ruling Radical Party of Serbia. At 
the price of their cooperation in passing a constitution which granted Belgrade 
greater control over the new state, Draga won greater indemnities for land 
targeted for redistribution. Cooperation between nationalist Serbs and Cemiyet 
extended through three separate parliamentary elections between 1920 and 1923, 
leading to mixed candidate lists in such Muslim-populated areas as Tetovo and 
southern Kosova.32 
Such acts of accommodation between these two camps should not be seen as 
a sign of Belgrade's willingness to include Muslims in South Serbia in a shared 
future. 'Land redistribution' comprised only one facet of a much larger policy 
to decimate the sheer physical presence of Muslims in the region. Attempts at 
colonizing the countryside were accompanied by mass police actions targeting 
South Serbia's largely Albanian-speaking rural population. Ad hoc attacks on 
villages and towns in Kosova and Vardar Macedonia gave way in the early 1930s 
to a government-backed program to forcibly remove all rural Albanians from 
South Serbia. Negotiators from the Republic of Turkey, which included Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, were willing to play a collaborative role in this mass cleansing 
of Muslims from the Macedonian countryside, agreeing in June 1938 to accept 
forty thousand families for resettlement in Anatolia over the next six years. The 
refusal of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to sign the treaty, followed by the 
outbreak of the Second World War, prevented the immediate implementation of 
the plan. Ironically, at this point in Belgrade's evolving program of undermining 
the presence of Macedonia's Muslim population, urban Muslims (i.e. areas most 
associated with Turkish-speakers) were excluded from the deportation orders.33
Cemiyet initially did not serve as the main focal point of resistance to 
the violence and oppression levied by Belgrade. Instead, an armed response 
to Serbia's genocidal policies fell to a variety of militant factions rooted in the 
countryside. The leaders of the so-called kaçak ('illegal' or 'renegade' in Turkish) 
resistance, ironically, came out of a similar Ottoman milieu as Necip and Ferhat 
History, 1996), 9; Millovan Obradoviq, 'Kolonizimi dhe Reforma Agrare në Funksion të Spastrimit 
Etnik të Shqiptarëvë [Colonization and Agrarian Reform as Function of Ethnic Cleansing of Albanians]', 
in Hivzi Islami, ed., Spastrimet Etnike: Politika Gjenocidale Serbe Ndaj Shqiptarëvë [Ethnic Cleansing: 
Serbian Genocidal Politics towards Albanians] (Pejë: Botoi Dukagjini, 2003), 175-188. 
31 Malcolm, Kosovo, 280. 
32 The Serb politician who later assassinated the Croat leader Stjepan Radić in 1928 was in fact an allied 
Radical candidate from Tetevo. See Banac, National Question, 377-378.
33 See Ryan Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1912-
1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 162-163.
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Draga. Like Necip, Hasan Prishtina, one of the more prominent kaçak leaders, 
was also a well-educated former CUP member and Ottoman parliamentarian with 
strong connections to both urban and rural political factions.34 Organized into 
small bands, the kaçaks staged attacks on the Yugoslav military and gendarmerie 
throughout the Vardar region. According to statistics gathered by the Committee 
for the National Defence of Kosova, an organization led by Albanian nationalists 
who supported the kaçak movement, 12,371 people had been killed and 22,110 
were imprisoned within the first three years of resistance.35 Eventually the weight 
of the violence forced Cemiyet's leadership to abandon its collaboration with the 
pro-nationalist Radicals. Ferhat Draga, who assumed control over the party after 
his brother's passing in 1921, finally broke with the Radicals by the end of 1923, 
an act which resulted in Draga's imprisonment for twenty years.36
Yugoslavia's fall after the Nazi Blitzkrieg of April 1941 further complicated 
Muslim acts of defiance and collaboration in the region. Vardar Macedonia was 
again subdivided, this time between Bulgarian and Italian occupation forces. 
Bulgarian occupation brought with it a concerted agenda of 'Bulgarification' of the 
Orthodox population and a general regime of exploitation, cruelty and indifference 
towards non-Christians.37 The Italian zone, which encompassed Kosova and 
Macedonia's western highlands, was attached to occupied Albania. Neither the 
Italians nor the Germans were ultimately successful in maintaining order without 
appealing, ironically, to Albanian nationalist and separatist sentiments in the 
region. With promises not to resist, local notables were able to secure provincial 
autonomy for their communities under the official aegis of a 'greater Albania'.38 
As inter-communal violence between royalists, collaborators and communists 
intensified throughout the war, many colonists who had received land from the 
Yugoslav government were attacked or driven off.39 These reversals of the anti-
34 Gawrych, The Crescent, 162.
35 Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores, 161-162.
36 Banac, National Question, 378; Malcolm, Kosovo, 271. After his imprisonment, Ferhat fled to 
Italian-occupied Albania. See 'Subject: Transmitting the Second Instalment of a WHO'S WHO IN 
YUGOSLAVIA', 3 April 1943, Yugoslavia, US Embassy, Belgrade, Istanbul General Consul Yugoslavia 
Dispatches, Record Group 84; National Archives Building II, Silver Spring, MD.
37 Rossos, Macedonia, 183-186. According to Mahmud Amid, a relative of one of the founding members 
of Cemiyet who was interviewed by US intelligence personnel in Istanbul in 1943, Muslims in Skopje 
faired poorly under Bulgarian occupation. In addition to exorbitantly high taxes, the theft of their 
property and the imposition of corvée duties by the Bulgarians, Muslims also confronted tensions with 
native Macedonians who sided with the occupation. Most Muslims, according to Mahmud Amid feared 
that they would be 'wiped out' should South Serbia be annexed to Bulgaria. As a result, he claimed, 
many favoured a return to the old Yugoslav system and the protection afforded to them by the Serbs. See 
'Subject: Information from Skopje according to a Moslem Traveler', 24 December 1943, Yugoslavia, 
US Embassy, Belgrade, Istanbul General Consul Yugoslavia Dispatches, Record Group 84; National 
Archives Building II, Silver Spring, MD.
38 Malcolm, Kosovo, 290-297.
39 One of the casualties of this conflict was Ferhat Daga's son, Selahettin, who was murdered in Belgrade 
in 1944. See Owen Pearson, Albania in Occupation and War: From Fascism to Communism, 1940-1945 
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Albanian policies of the interwar period proved short-lived. Nazi Germany's 
defeat, together with the reconsolidation of Yugoslavia under the Communist 
Party, transformed various acts of collaboration among rural Muslims into a stain 
that besmirched Albanians throughout Macedonia and Kosova well after the war 
concluded.40 
As one traces the evolution of Macedonia through the interwar period, one 
cannot lose sight of the fact that Muslims in South Serbia or northern Greece did 
not stand alone in confronting the post-Ottoman era. Partition and occupation 
were traumas and challenges of no less severity for those who found themselves 
in the Mandate states of Iraq, Syria and Palestine. While surely there were those 
who did support the creation of a unified Arab state (such as the officers and 
notables who joined the Arab Revolt of 1916), most Muslims and Christians 
residing in the Arab lands remained loyal to Istanbul to the very end (with some 
maintaining their loyalty even after the war was over).41 When partition and 
occupation appeared inevitable, rebellion erupted in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. It was 
only with great difficulty, bloodshed and some compromise that the British and 
French suppressed these revolts.
Once the dust had settled from these rebellions, post-Ottoman politics 
in the Arab Middle East shifted increasingly towards a begrudging pattern 
of accommodation with the new order. French officials turned to old urban 
notables to help them administer Mandate Syria.42 Former officers, men who had 
previously been loyal to the Ottoman state and the CUP, came to embrace the 
Iraqi state and military service under the British-imposed monarchy.43 A public 
school curriculum forged by Sati al-Husri embraced and legitimized an Iraqi 
Arab nationalism within the confines of the Mandate's borders.44 This cumulative 
picture of accommodation and cooperation in the post-Ottoman Middle East is 
made further complex by Zachary Lockman's research into the activities of Jewish 
and Arab labour organizers during the 1930s.45 If juxtaposed with these examples 
from the Arab lands, Cemiyet and other attempts by Macedonian Muslims to 
collaborate with the political order of South Serbia appear rather moderate 
and sparing.
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 367-368.
40 Malcolm, Kosovo, 312-313.
41 Kayali, Arabs, 203-205.
42 Philip Khoury, 'Continuity and Change in Syrian Political Life: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries', 
American Historical Review 96, 5 (December 1991): 1374-1395.
43 Reeva Simon, 'The Education of an Iraqi Ottoman Army Officer', in Rashid Khalidi et al., eds., The 
Origins of Arab Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 151-166.
44 Sati al-Husri, it should be noted, served in Macedonia and Jannina early in his career as an Ottoman 
educator and administrator. William L. Cleveland, The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and 
Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati al-Husri (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 19.
45 Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-1948 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
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As one further compares patterns of conflict and cooperation in Macedonia 
with the evolution of the former Ottoman Arab lands, certain major differences 
cannot be ignored. One must hesitate in drawing too direct a comparison between 
the modus vivendi of British and French Mandate authorities and Serb (or Greek 
or Bulgarian) administrators in Macedonia. London made no historical claim of 
ownership over Iraq and ultimately sought to exercise a limited degree of influence 
in Mesopotamia after 1920. A fairly recently defined set of geo-strategic priorities 
(and, in the case of France, some supposed cultural ties) linked London and Paris 
with their Mandate territories.46
We also see some differences in how the French and British handled the 
demographic nature of their newly claimed territories in the Middle East. No 
Mandate power denied the existence of the Arab and Muslim majorities or non-
Muslim, non-Arabic-speaking minorities. British diplomats at Lausanne, for 
example, were forthright in their assertions that the Kurds of northern Iraq formed 
a distinct population set apart from the Turks of Anatolia.47 In the cases of Syria's 
Alawites or Iraq's Sunni population, both the French and British were willing to 
empower regional minorities as a means of maintaining order and the permanence 
of the Mandate regime.48 
If there is one point of contrast that most divides the experience of Muslims in 
Macedonia from their counterparts living elsewhere in the former Ottoman world, 
it would be in the realm of violence. The sheer sustained ferocity of the police 
actions and deportations that plagued Muslims throughout Macedonia is perhaps 
best comparable to the events and policies that culminated in the Palestinian 
nakba of 1948. One can draw a clear and consistent line of nationalization and 
ethnic cleansing from the establishment of kibbutz cooperatives to Plan Dalet 
implemented in April-May 1948; in the anticipation of the invasion of Arab 
armies to the fledging Jewish state, many facets of Palestinian space were to be 
made Jewish while Muslim and Christian natives were compelled, one way or 
another, to vanish.49 A similar vigour and aggression governed the policies of the 
Republic of Turkey towards the lands of eastern Anatolia. Despite comparable 
patterns of denial, nationalization and violence, there is an important distinction 
46 See Patricia Lorcin, 'Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria's Latin Past', French 
Historical Studies 25, 2 (Spring 2002): 295-329. In the case of Algeria, French archaeologists and 
administrators saw themselves as reviving Algeria's Roman past.
47 See Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922–1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft 
Terms of Peace (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923), 356-357.
48 Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), 43-80; Khoury, 'Continuity and Change', 1394.
49 Benny Morris, 'Revisiting the Palestinian Exodus of 1948', in Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., 
The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
37-59; Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (London: Oneworld, 2007); Ted Swedenburg, 
Memories of Revolt: The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past (Little Rock: University 
of Arkansas Press, 2003). 
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to be made between Palestine, Turkey and Macedonia. Ankara could and did 
conceive of ways of 'turning' Kurds or Laz into Turks;50 no one in the Jewish 
Agency or interwar Belgrade or Athens could have conceived of a formula that 
could bodily or philosophically reengineer native Sunni Muslims wholesale into 
nationally desirable citizens. 
If we are to take the comparison further, the nationalizing policies of Israel, 
Turkey and Greece were not entirely coherent. Each of these states was prepared 
to afford a certain amount of protection and recognition to a few 'national' 
minorities. In the case of Yugoslavia, Belgrade's willingness to extend a modicum 
of recognition to urban Muslims during the interwar period did bear interesting 
fruit with the conclusion of the Axis occupation. Inclusion of Turcophone 
notables in the political process during the interwar period set a precedent that 
would be followed, and amplified, by the subsequent communist regime. For 
Muslims seeking rapprochement with Belgrade after 1945, two equally daunting 
questions had to be addressed: First, through what venues do Muslims integrate 
into Tito's Yugoslavia? Second, how do Muslims reconcile themselves with the 
'new' Yugoslavia despite the violence and oppression of the old?
A New Wave of Brotherhood and Unity?: Macedonian Muslims 
and Titoism
Macedonia's status as both a state and a national home loomed large as Tito's 
Partisans gathered strength throughout Yugoslavia. While a communist consensus 
towards the creation of a Macedonian state had been incubating since the interwar 
period, it took the Axis occupation to spur the Communist Party in Yugoslavia 
(KPJ) to press the issue to fruition. The path to Macedonian statehood progressed 
steadily through the Second World War from the organization of armed Partisan 
brigades to the announcement on 2 August 1944 of a sovereign Macedonian 
government in the former region of South Serbia.51 Macedonian independence, 
however, would remain limited to the Vardar region; those who remained in 
either Pirin (Bulgaria) or Aegean Macedonia (Greece) saw no change in their 
political status.52 
The creation of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, above all, signified a 
cultural revolution long in the making. With the passage of the 1946 constitution, 
Belgrade recognized Macedonians as one of the five constituent national groups 
comprising Tito's Yugoslavia. A codified, officially recognized Macedonian 
language began to take shape within months of the August 1944 declaration. An 
emerging 'national' leadership soon endorsed the creation of a national university 
50 Uğur Ümit Üngör, 'Seeing like a Nation-State: Young Turk Social Engineering in Eastern Turkey, 1913-
1950', Journal of Genocide Research 10,1 (2008): 15-39.
51 Rossos, Macedonia, 189-196.
52 Ibid., 197-202.
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in Skopje, sanctioned opening of a national theatre and elevated a select number 
of authors to the status of national poets.53 This cultural turn towards a self-
consciously cultivated Macedonian identity naturally entailed the rewriting of 
the region's history in favour of a long-suppressed and insurgent Macedonian 
nationalist tendency.
Belgrade's affirmation of an officially recognized Macedonian majority in 
former South Serbia did, however, come with certain corollaries. The passage of 
the 1946 federal constitution in the nascent republic made a point of identifying 
the presence of a select number of 'national minorities' within the confines of 
Macedonia. Serbs, Turks, Albanians and Vlachs were each identified as protected 
minorities who would have the right (one could even say the responsibility) of 
developing their own cultural institutions.54 Such compromises with nationalism 
(be it with 'majority' or 'minority' populations) followed the Soviet model of 
crafting regional administrations. Under the umbrella of a federalized system of 
governance (with each federal unit corresponding to a specific dominant local 
majority), the ascendant Titoist government hoped national development among 
previously oppressed minorities would provide a gateway to acceptance and 
inclusion into the emerging socialist system. As past wrongs were addressed 
through various forms of national 'affirmative action' policies, it was hoped that 
these newly redeemed beneficiaries would gradually see the light of the non-
national, secular socialist state. In other words, after ingesting their fill of their 
local national institutions, gradually Albanians, Bosnian Muslims, Turks and 
Croats would shed, like dead skin, their old national ties and traits in exchange for 
the more progressive and modern bonds of the socialist federation.55
This agenda to create or recreate national identities was documented on a 
week-to-week basis by Birlik, the Turcophone national weekly which would 
service the nascent Macedonian Republic on and off for over a half century.56 
What one sees in the years between 1947 (the first year of the publication) and 
1953 (the year Yugoslavia and Turkey signed a mutual pact of friendship) is a 
collaborative effort on the part of Turkish-speaking and non-Turkish-speaking 
journalists, politicians, teachers, labour activists, housewives, poets and members 
of the ulema to define the role of Muslims in the Yugoslav state. The principal 
figures who acted as the representatives of Muslim Macedonians were by and 
large the children of professional families from şehirli backgrounds. Virtually all 
of the spokesmen and leaders who represented the Communist Party, individuals 
53 Ibid., 249-256.
54 'Makedonya Halk Cumhuriyetinin Ana Yasa İlan Edildi [The Constitution of the People's Republic of 
Macedonia Declared]', Birlik, 10 January 1947.
55 See Terry Martin, Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
56 Birlik was first published in 1947. By the early 1990s it was infrequently published and came to end by 
2001. 
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such as Kemal Seyfullah, Nazim Firüz or Sedat Veli, were born well after the fall 
of the Ottoman Empire and the First World War.57 In 1950, Birlik took great pains 
to note that each of the 'Turks' elected to parliament were veterans of the Partisan 
struggle (though only a few were party members before the war).58
Birlik's editorial staff provided an echo chamber for the speeches delivered 
by the men and women tasked with leading Muslims into socialism. A general 
and amiable historical narrative of the previous forty years quickly coalesced over 
the course of the early issues. With the collapse of the 'Oriental', 'oppressive' 
and 'feudal' Ottoman regime, 'Greater Serb chauvinism' reigned.59 Under 
Serb oppression, Turks and Albanians found common cause with Christian 
Macedonians. With the valiant 'war of independence (kurtuluş savaşı)' against 
the fascists and occupiers won and complete, no one could doubt the spirit of 
brotherhood and unity (kardeşlik ve birlik) among all the elements of Macedonia. 
Yes, grave atrocities were committed against Turks and Albanians and many 
were indeed forced to flee for Turkey. But now only nationalists or religious 
reactionaries would think of departing Macedonia for the 'imperialist' camp 
in Anatolia.60 
Although officially advocating and proselytizing from the perspective of the 
'Turkish minority' of Macedonia, Birlik's coverage of local and national affairs 
often emphasized the commonalities and shared interests of Muslims found 
throughout the region. The rhetorical dyad 'Turks and Albanians' appears with 
great regularity with many printings (for example, 'The Recruitment of Skopje 
Turk and Albanian [Şiptar] Minorities into the Peoples' War of Independence').61 
This common blending (and even blurring) of the lines between 'Turks' and 
'Albanians' in Birlik's coverage (a trend which again dates back to the Ottoman 
period) is further notable for the fact that many of the individuals featured in 
stories and reports often bear no discernable Turkish or Albanian patronyms (for 
example, names ending with either 'oğlu', 'li' or 'i'). 
In addressing both Turks and Albanians, Birlik's editors and contributors 
frequently broached issues related to the practice and application of Islam 
within the confines of the new socialist order. In some sense Birlik ventured 
57 'FHYC Millet Meclisine Gidecek Azlıklara Mensup Namzetler [Candidates Belonging to Minorities 
Will Go to the SFRY National Assembly]', Birlik, 12 March 1950.
58 'Makedonya Halk Cumhuriyeti Millet Meclisine Mebus Namzetlerimiz-Türkler [Turks – Our Candidates 
to the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Macedonia]', Birlik, 29 November 1950. 
59 'Mustafa Said Sözünden [From Mustafa Said's Speech]', Birlik, 10 January 1947; 'Türklerin Halk 
İdaresine İştiraki ve Siyasi Faaliyetlei, [The Participation of Turks in the People's Administration and 
Their Political Activities]', Birlik, 31 July 1949; 'Bir Mais İştip Türk Festivalleri [A Turkish May Festival 
in Shtip]', Birlik, 10 May 1950.
60 'Milli Azınlıkları Sosyalist Camiamızdan Ayırmağa Çalışan Düşmanın her Teşebüsüne karşı Savaşa 
Önem Verilmeli [Urgency Bestowed on the War against the Enemy's Every Attempt to Separate the 
National Minorities from Our Mosques]', Birlik, 31 March 1954.
61 'Üsküplü Türk ve Şiptar Azlıklarının Halk Kurtuluş Harbına İştiraki [Skopje's Turkish and Albanian 
Minorities Joining the National Liberation War]', Birlik, 1 October 1948. 
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into well-travelled territory when approaching Islam. Throughout the interwar 
period, debates raged in both South Serbia and Bosnia over the development 
of a 'modernized' and 'post-Ottoman' form of Islam.62 When dealing directly 
with Islamic dogma, the paper often printed declarations and essays written by 
members of Skopje's Council of Islamic Clergy (Ülema Meclisi) or by İbrahim 
Fehiç (the national Reisül-Ulema). While certainly never denying or discouraging 
belief in the existence of God, Birlik's treatment of Islam above all emphasized the 
need to harmonize religion with modernity. In this regard, education was deemed 
key. Under socialism, all children, boys and girls, would be educated equally in 
the modern arts and sciences. The education of the mosques and medreses in turn 
would be abandoned (but not outlawed). As the editorial staff at Birlik would 
have it, students would naturally reject the dirty floors and windowless 'prisons' 
of older religious schools and gladly forgo having to spend hours memorizing the 
Koran in Arabic.63 
At the heart of this reinvention of Islam and Muslim identity in Macedonia 
was the state's supreme emphasis on the 'elevation' of Turkish and Albanian 
women. This turn in Yugoslav communism was not unique in the Second World; 
like the endowment of rights and development of the folk cultures of 'national 
minorities', the edification and advancement of women was deemed critical 
throughout the Soviet Union and other socialist states.64 Two specific programs 
particularly targeted the mothers, wives and daughters of Muslims in Yugoslav 
Macedonia: the expansion of literacy and educational opportunities for women 
and the casting off of the headscarf (çarşaf or ferace).
A subtle revolution in the Turkish language accompanied the ascendancy of 
Titoism in Yugoslavia. Up until 1945, Ottoman Turkish, written in the imperial 
script, remained the lingua franca of Turcophones in Macedonia. The publication 
of Birlik and the recognition of Turks as a national minority after 1946 ushered 
a new standardization of the language. First and foremost, Turkish was now to 
be written with a modified Latin alphabet. While the language appears quite 
similar to the Turkish used in the Turkish Republic, several important points of 
differentiation are noticeable. First and foremost, Birlik retained many elements 
of the Turkish language's imperial roots in terms of grammar and vocabulary. Like 
the Kemalist reforms, these 'reforms' were not simply meant to make acquisition 
62 Muhammed Aruçi, 'The Muslim Minority in Macedonia and Its Educational Institutions during the 
Inter-War Period', in Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain, eds., Islam in Inter-War Europe (New York: 
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eds., Islam in Inter-War Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 313-343.
63 'Analfabetizmaya karşı Savaşırken: Yeni Analfabetler Yetiştirmiyelim [Fighting against Alphabetism]', 
Birlik, 25 January 1947.
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of literacy easier for the largely illiterate masses. Rather, it was a direct attempt to 
distance the 'modern language' from its Islamic heritage.65
If one had to identify the most dominant theme of reporting that adorned the 
pages of Birlik during the late 1940s and early 1950s, it is clear that the state's 
efforts to expand literacy among both Turks and Albanians assumed the primary 
position. A spirit of urgency, optimism, diligence and procedure underscored 
each glowing story on the steps being taken to end illiteracy among Turks and 
Albanians (the two least literate groups in the country according to Birlik).66 
Statistics showing progress towards full literacy were constantly cited and revised 
as the weeks passed. The overwhelming majority of stories on state literacy 
programs enacted in both the towns and villages of Macedonia focused on women. 
In addition to highlighting the attendance numbers and success rates of peasant 
girls and urban mothers who attended literacy classes, Birlik presented its readers 
with testimonials of 'working women' and newly elected female representatives 
who touted the transformative experiences that accompanied learning to read and 
write. It was true that some men were attempting to keep their womenfolk at home 
and imprisoning them in ignorance. But the true enemies of women's literacy 
were religious reactionaries.
Beginning in 1947, Birlik began to inform its readers on a series of public 
meetings in both Kosova and Macedonia devoted to the question of veiling. The 
women who attended these gatherings, be they among the new political notables 
of the region or common villagers, unanimously agreed that the veil had to 
be discarded for the sake of progress and development.67 As the years passed, 
Birlik relayed a steady stream of written declarations, eyewitness accounts and 
testimonials from women throughout the countryside. Peasant women, despite the 
disapproval of male chauvinists and religious reactionaries, were spontaneously 
gathering in village centres all over Macedonia to demonstrate their rejection of 
the headscarf.68 A formal law banning the çarşaf would ultimately be passed in 
January 1951, an act Birlik triumphantly celebrated for several weeks.69 Throughout 
its coverage of the headscarf issue, Birlik again emphasized that abandoning this 
long-held custom was not an attack on Islam. Sympathetic members of the ulema, 
65 'Analfabetizmaya karşı Savaşırken: Yeni Analfabetler Yetiştirmiyelim [Fighting against Alphabetism]', 
Birlik, 25 January 1947.
66 'Türk ve Arnavut Kadının Gelişmesi: Onun Yazı Okuma Ögrenmesine Bağlıdı [Development of the 
Turkish and Albanian Woman: It Is Tied to Their Learning to Read and Write]', Birlik, 10 January 1947.
67 'Kosova ve Metohiya Kadınlarının Ferece Atma Faaliyetini [Activities of Kosova and Metohija Women 
Casting Off the Veil]', Birlik, 10 April 1947; 'Üskübün Türk ve Şiptar Kadınları Feraceyi Atmak için 
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138 PART II |  Political and Cultural Legacies 
including İbrahim Fehiç, affirmed this formal party line.70
Towards a Conclusion: Trying to Find Harmony between 
Ottomanism, Titoism and the Evolution of the Post-Ottoman World
Birlik's coverage of life and times in Macedonia reflected a general celebration 
of socialism's ascendancy in Yugoslavia. The overachievements of Turkish and 
Albanian 'Stakhanovite' (or darbeci) workers were frequently reported alongside 
the construction of new schools and farming cooperatives. In addition to poems 
and short stories emphasizing socialist values, brief historical accounts of the 
struggle that led to the creation of Yugoslavia (beginning with the supposed acts 
of Turkish-Macedonian cooperation during the Ilinden Uprising in 1903) were 
featured in the back pages.
 Yet, at best, the stories and opinions exhibited in Birlik represented only a 
fraction of reality in Macedonia. Rather than an event generally celebrated by the 
grateful masses, the passage of the anti-veiling laws in fact posed a devastating 
and humiliating blow to tens of thousands of women. In a grand show trial in 
1948, seventeen men suspected of being pro-Ankara Turkish agents and wreckers 
were indicted, leading many Muslims to identify themselves as Albanians in 
the national census that year.71 The political winds shifted again in 1953 with 
the signing of a friendship accord between Turkey and Yugoslavia. Under the 
auspices of the agreement, 'ethnic Turks' were allowed to legally emigrate out of 
Yugoslavia. Within a few short years, a tidal wave of migrants made their way 
from Macedonia to Turkey. Driven by acts of discrimination and poverty, both 
Turkish and Albanian-speakers applied for exit visas with the intention of not 
returning. It is tempting, and seems warranted, to view this pattern of outmigration, 
which continues to this day, in direct continuity with the acts of ethnic cleansing 
of Macedonian Muslims that have occurred since 1912.72 
Considering the amount of suffering that accompanied the establishment 
of Tito's Yugoslavia, how should we understand the people, stories and politics 
reflected in the pages of Birlik? Should one simply say that those who penned the 
reports, made the editorial decisions or agreed to collaborate with programs
70 'Ferace Taşımanın Dinle hiç bir Alakası Yoktur [There is No Religious Connection to Wearing the Veil]', 
Birlik, 15 May 1947; 'Feracenin Atılması hakkında Reis-ul-ulemanın Bayanatı [Reisül-Ulema's Speech 
on Casting Off the Veil]', Birlik, 22 August 1950.
71 Mehmed Ardıcı, Yücelciler 1947 (Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1991); Burcu Akan Ellis, 'Shadow 
Genealogies: Memory and Identity among Urban Muslims in Macedonia', PhD diss. American 
University, 2000, 97-99.
72 See Nurcan Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 'Devletlerin Dış Politikaları Açısından Göç Olgusu: Balkanlar'dan 
Türkiye'ye Arnavut Göçleri (1920-1990) [The Phenomenon of Migration from the Perspective of 
Foreign Policies of States: Albanian Migration from the Balkans to Turkey (1920-1990)]', PhD diss., 
Istanbul University, 2003, passim.
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 featured in the various news cycles were petty quislings? If one assumes a 
wider lens, I believe a certain amount of forgiveness could be extended to those 
Muslims who profited from the imposition of socialism over their neighbours and 
kin in Macedonia. 
A more nuanced understanding of the individuals and agendas put forth by 
Birlik's writers, editors and subjects can only be achieved if one takes into account 
the four decades that preceded the rebirth of Yugoslavia in 1945. The history of 
Muslims in Macedonia, including both the republic and the lands that are now 
portions of Greece and Bulgaria, is one overwhelmingly typified by terror, loss 
and flight. However, in what became the Republic of Macedonia, many Muslims, 
in both town and country, did stay on. Survival, cooperation and inclusion lay at 
the heart of the history of this segment of Macedonia's Muslim population. What 
one sees between the years 1908 and 1953 is a constant effort by members of the 
Muslim elite of the region (be they Turcophones or Albanian-speakers) to reinvent 
themselves and lend their voices to the unfolding political and social events.
In looking at the early Titoist era, we see several definitive breaks in continuity 
that had earlier spanned the formation of elite politics between the Ottoman and 
early Yugoslav periods. No member of the new Muslim leadership, individuals 
such as Mustafa Said, Nazim Firüz or Kemal and Kevser Seyfullah, possessed any 
living memory of life under the sultans or the CUP. Their young political and social 
lives were instead rooted in two concrete themes that marked the development 
of royal Yugoslavia. Each experienced and witnessed the possibility of political 
inclusion as representatives of the Muslim 'minority' in South Serbia. Perhaps 
more important, they shared, along with every other member of Macedonian 
society, a bitter history of total war and brutal occupation between 1941 and 1945. 
Tito's victory in 1945 reopened the possibility of political and social integration 
in a new political order. For those who accepted the confines and values of the 
new order (which many of these early Muslim leaders may have come to acquire 
in the years shortly before or during the Second World War), a place in the new 
Yugoslavia was possible.
A second point of discontinuity is the absence of a violent rural dissident 
movement during the early years of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. 
According to all available sources, there was no rebirth of the kaçak movement 
nor any re-emergence of a political figure in the mould of Hasan Prishtina. The 
question of who precisely represented the rural segment of Muslim Macedonia 
becomes more complicated when one considers the fact that Muslims often 
registered or re-registered themselves during the national census periods as either 
Turks or Albanians. If one considers this temporal fluctuation in the actual size 
and definition of Turkish and Albanian population in Macedonia, it seems likely 
that a definitive set of rural (i.e. Albanian) political and social leaders remained 
amorphous during the early years of Tito's Yugoslavia. One could say that a clearly 
formed and articulate rural and Albanian militant opposition did not materialize 
until after 1997. 
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If one zooms out further still and thinks comparatively about the evolution 
of the post-Ottoman world by the 1950s, Macedonia's new Muslim elite appears 
rather distant from its counterparts in the Arab lands or Anatolia. Birlik drew 
no comparisons between the Muslims leaving Macedonia and the trials and 
tribulations of exiled Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria or Jordan. Birlik offered 
Gamal Abdel Nasser no fanfare and gave no attention or sympathy to the plight 
of those Iraqis or Algerians who violently confronted Western imperialism. No 
credence was given to Islamic revivalism advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood 
(although it has been argued that an underground following did emerge among 
Macedonian Muslims during the interwar period).73 Up until 1953, Birlik made 
few allusions to life and politics in the Republic of Turkey either (those few stories 
that did refer to Turkey only emphasized its alliances with American imperialism 
or the oppression of workers and labour activists in the country).74 It is only after 
1953, with the signing of a friendship accord between Belgrade and Ankara, that 
pleasant stories about Turkish tourism and history graced the pages of the paper.75 
This silence and distance apparent in Muslim Macedonia's relations with the 
former lands of the Ottoman Empire should not simply be seen as some reflection 
of the general lack of popular political expression found throughout the communist 
world. From the perspective of the elite at least, Tito's victory had at last severed 
the old imperial ties that bound Macedonia to Syria, Egypt or even Turkey. Like 
the four old, flabby ağas portrayed in the cartoon above, that aspect of the region's 
culture, politics and social makeup was rightly disappearing, if it had not already.
Although much of the political, economic and social constructs of what 
had been Ottoman Macedonia had vanished, we still see some retention of old 
imperial norms. Birlik's diction and approach towards Muslims underscored the 
fact that ethnic and linguistic borders remained somewhat blurry at the midpoint 
of the twentieth century. In addressing stories and political issues important to 
both 'Turks and Albanians' (be it veiling, literacy or education in general), Birlik 
reinforced the fact that Islam provided a common basis for identity and belonging 
for Turcophones and non-Turcophones. With its heavy emphasis on Skopje, 
Bitola and other major urban centres, one gets the sense that Birlik was more of a 
şehirli paper than a publication strictly catering to Turks. 
Still, one cannot ignore the emphasis Birlik placed on identifying Macedonia's 
Muslim population as comprising both Albanians and Turks. Here we can also see 
73 Aruçi, 'Muslim Minority', 356.
74 'Amerika Ekspansionistleri Türkiyede [American Expansionists in Turkey]', Birlik, 1 April 1948; 
'Hapıshanede Nazim Hikmet Grev Yapıyor [Nazim Hikmet Goes on Strike in Prison]', Birlik, 20 May 
1950; 'Türkiyenin Kara Deniz vilayetlerinde işsizlik ve açlık [Unemployment and Hunger in Turkey's 
Black Sea Provinces]', Birlik, 20 May 1950.
75 Şükrü Ramo, 'Ankara'da [In Ankara]', Birlik, 22 January 1953; 'Üsküp Türk-Şiptar Halk Tiyatrosunda 
Türkiye Gençleriyle bir Görüşme [A Meeting with Young People from Turkey in the Skopje Turkish-
Albanian People's Theater]', Birlik, 18 April 1953.
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a historical tangent rooted in the late Ottoman experience. Since at least 1908, one 
of the core demands put forward by the diverse elements of the Muslim elite was 
the legal right to use and develop Turkish and Albanian as official lingua francas. 
The Titoist state, like other communist systems, placated these demands under 
the auspices of socialist developmentalism. One could say that those Muslim 
leaders who rode Tito's coattails into power achieved a victory that the past two 
generations of political notables had failed to realize.
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